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In 2017, the EU implemented the mid-term review of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its 
financial instrument, the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI). The first elements of this new strat-
egy, including the new Partnership Priorities (PP) 
were adopted after the June 2016 Global Strategy of 
the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy 
(EUGS), which contributed to the reorientation of 
the EU’s external action as a whole. In September 
2016, the European Commission also proposed a 
new European External Investment Plan (EIP) for Af-
rica and the EU Neighborhood. 
The implementation of the ENP mid-term review, the 
EUGS and the EIP are three indicators of the pro-
gressive reorientation of the EU’s external action in 
its neighbourhood. The aim of this article is, there-
fore, to focus on the novelties of an approach that is 
now based, according to the EU’s Foreign and Se-
curity Policy, on ‘principled pragmatism.’1
The Implementation of the ENP Review: 
Supporting Stabilization and Resilience in a 
Neighborhood Deeply Affected by Conflicts 
and Crisis
Following the November 2015 Communication on 
the ENP review,2 new frameworks for ‘bilateral en-
gagement’ were concluded with some ENP part-
ners through “Partnership Priorities, updated Asso-
ciation Agendas or existing Action Plans.” The 
novelty is the adoption of new Partnership priorities 
alongside the traditional ENP instruments. These 
different ‘joint bilateral documents’ are supposed to 
reflect ‘shared political priorities’ and to provide the 
“basis for the ongoing programming exercise of the 
new bilateral assistance programmes (Single Sup-
port Frameworks)”3 under the ENI, for the 2017-
2020 period.
The new Partnership Priorities with Lebanon and 
Jordan were adopted in December 2016 notably to 
“help both countries address the impact of the refu-
gees following the Syrian conflict.” Also, the so-
called new ‘Compacts,’ containing “priority actions 
and mutual commitments were agreed and annexed 
to the Partnership Priorities.” As mentioned in the 
‘Report on the Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Review,’ “both partner coun-
tries were already receiving EU assistance to ad-
dress the needs and promote the resilience and 
self-reliance of refugees and vulnerable host com-
munities.”4 It is, therefore, more the format that has 
changed.
The EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities were adopt-
ed through a decision of the Association Council on 
11 November 2016.5 This is of importance as the 
decisions that were used to adopt the Action Plans 
are legally binding, contrary to recommendations. 
The preamble of the decision states that the second 
EU-Lebanon Action Plan “came to an end in 2015 
and has not been renewed.” Therefore, the EU and 
1 CounCil of the eu. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016.
2 european Commission and high representative. Joint Communication on the “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy,” Brussels, 
18 November 2015, JOIN(2015) 50.
3 european Commission and high representative. Joint Communication Report on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy Review, Brussels, 18 May 2017, JOIN(2017) 18, p. 4.
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5 Decision No 1/2016 of the EU-Lebanon Association Council agreeing on EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities, OJ L 350, 22 December 2016, pp. 114-125.
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Lebanon have decided to “consolidate their part-
nership” and agreed on a “set of priorities for the 
period 2016-2020, with the aim of supporting and 
strengthening Lebanon’s resilience and stability 
while seeking to address the impact of the protract-
ed conflict in Syria.” The “EU-Lebanon Partnership 
Priorities, including the Compact” supporting the 
“implementation of the Agreement” on the basis of a 
set of “commonly identified shared interests,” have 
thus been adopted simultaneously. The five PP are 
the following:
— Security and countering terrorism (“security 
sector reforms” and “institutional capacity of se-
curity actors including law enforcement, security 
management, oversight bodies and justice”);
— Governance and rule of law (“institutional capac-
ity building”;  promotion of the “shared values of 
democracy and the rule of law including good 
governance and transparent, stable and effective 
institutions, protection of free speech and an in-
dependent press”; “independence of the justice 
system,” and “efficient public sector”);
— Fostering growth and job opportunities (nota-
bly: municipalities; private investment infrastruc-
ture; trade, agriculture, industry; energy securi-
ty, clima te action and conservation of natural 
resources);
— Migration and mobility: (negotiating a “joint dec-
laration to launch their Mobility Partnership”);
— Mechanisms for dialogue and mutual coordina-
tion.
For this last priority the general idea is to “rationalize 
and optimize the implementation of the Association 
Agreement.” This implies a “thorough rethinking of 
the dialogues and sub-committees taking place.” 
The current sub-committees will, for example, be re-
grouped into “fewer thematic meetings.” Obviously, 
the search for greater efficiency is a core priority 
and this is true for all partners.
The EU-Lebanon Compact, annexed to the PP, sets 
out some mutually agreed actions and defines “pri-
ority actions to support the stabilization of the coun-
try” over the period 2016-2020. It also underlines 
that the “mechanism to review progress in the im-
plementation of the Compact will draw inter alia on 
the policy dialogues under the general framework of 
the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement.” A first ex-
ample of reciprocal commitments can be taken from 
the first PP as referred to in Table 4.
Another example of, this time, ‘mutual objectives’ 
can be found at the level of the PP on migration and 
mobility as we can see in Table 5.
The willingness to reinforce ownership is obvious 
in these two examples. The approach followed for 
TABLE 4 EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities: 1st Priority
1. Enhancing Stability: Security and Counter-Terrorism 
EU Commitments Lebanon Commitments 
a)   Actively support the implementation of the counter-terrorism 
roadmap through technical assistance and financial and 
non-financial support. 
b)   Provide technical assistance and financial support in countering 
criminal activities including the fight against the smuggling and 
trafficking of humans, drugs and firearms. 
c)   Reinforce Integrated Border Management by supporting the four 
border agencies. 
d)  Support to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
e)   Support conflict prevention and mediation as well as interventions 
aimed at countering violent extremism and diffusing tensions. 
f)   Intensify cooperation and support on aviation safety and security. 
i)   Improve the coordination of security services, including agencies 
responsible for border management.
ii)   Support the operational activities of the interministerial Counter-
Terrorism Committee established on 26/5/2016.
iii)   Design and implement a comprehensive integrated counter-terrorism 
strategy in line with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.
iv)   Agree an Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy, including 
increased coordination of Lebanese security agencies and cooperation 
within relevant EU programmes. 
v)   Intensify cooperation on aviation safety and security.
Source: Decision No 1/2016 of the EU-Lebanon Association Council agreeing on EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities, 11 November 2016.
TABLE 5 EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities: 4th Priority
4. Migration and Mobility 
EU – Lebanon Mutual Objectives 
Once agreed, EU and Lebanon will implement fully the mutual political commitments of the Mobility Partnership after its adoption and all the actions 
in the related Annex, in line with the following priorities identified therein: 
- Promoting and facilitating well-managed legal migration and mobility 
- Strengthening the capacity of the relevant Lebanese authorities to manage borders and prevent irregular migration 
- Strengthening the nexus between migration and development 
- Enhancing dialogue and cooperation on matters related to refugees, allowing for thorough discussion of concerns. 
Source: Decision No 1/2016 of the EU-Lebanon Association Council agreeing on EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities, 11 November 2016.
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the adoption, in December 2016, of the EU-Jordan 
Partnership Priorities and annexed Compact6 is 
similar to the EU-Lebanon one, as the PP replaces 
the EU-Jordan Action Plan which entered into 
force in October 2012. However, a specific Ad-
dendum 1 includes detailed Jordan-EU commit-
ments concerning: enhancing macro-economic 
stability; private sector development, business cli-
mate, trade and investment, job creation; quality 
education and training for social inclusion and de-
velopment; sustainable use and management of 
natural resources; strengthening cooperation on 
stability and security including counter-terrorism; 
well-managed refugee, migration and mobility poli-
cies; and justice and political reform, democratic 
elections and human rights. There is also a spe-
cific ‘Addendum 2’ containing ‘quantitative bench-
marks’ proposed to “monitor progress in the imple-
mentation of the EU-Jordan compact.” It is clearly 
indicated that the “monitoring will occur on a regu-
lar basis and at least once a year, in the context of 
the foreseen review mechanisms and the meetings 
related to the bilateral cooperation between the 
EU and Jordan.” This specific addendum 2 is re-
produced in Table 6.
 The five Partnership Priorities with Algeria, adopted in 
March 2017 with the decision 1/2017 of the EU-Alge-
ria Association Council7 are, up to 2020, as follows:
i) Political dialogue, governance, the rule of law 
and the promotion of fundamental rights;
ii) Cooperation, socio-economic development, in-
cluding trade and access to the European sin-
gle market;
iii) Energy, the environment and sustainable devel-
opment;
iv) Strategic and security dialogue;
v) The human dimension, including cultural and in-
ter-religious dialogue, migration and mobility.
It is worth mentioning that Algeria concluded an As-
sociation Agreement (AA) but never agreed on an 
ENP Action plan. No evaluation, therefore, in the 
form of the so-called Regular reports, has ever been 
adopted. Moreover, the original tariff dismantling 
calendar for the bilateral Free trade area of the AA 
has been prolonged by three years (1 September 
2020). The revised ENP therefore enabled, in 2017, 
the evaluation of the implementation of the AA, 
through a “Report on the state of play of EU-Algeria 
relationships in the framework of the renovated 
ENP,” 8 and an agreement to be reached on the new 
Partnership Priorities. However, no ‘Compact’ is re-
ferred to in decision n°1/2017.
The three Partnership Priorities with Egypt were 
adopted in July 2017, not on the basis of a decision 
but through recommendation n° 1/2017 of the EU-
Egypt Association Council of 25 July 2017.9 As 
mentioned above, the difference is that a recom-
mendation is not legally binding, contrary to a deci-
sion. Moreover, only three priorities have been iden-
tified: i) Egypt’s sustainable modern economy and 
6 Decision n° 1/2016 of the EU-Jordan Association Council of 19 December 2016 agreeing on EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities, OJ L 355, 24 
December 2016, p. 31.
7 Decision No 1/2017 of the EU-Algeria Association Council of 13 March 2017 agreeing on EU-Algeria partnership priorities, OJ L 82, 29 
March 2017, p. 9.
8 european Commission amd high reprfsentative, Rapport sur l’état des relations UE-Algérie dans le cadre de la PEV rénovée, SWD(2017) 
109, Brussels, 9 March 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/rapport_sur_l27etat_des_relations_ue-algerie_2018.pdf
9 Recommendation n° 1/2017 of the EU-Egypt Association Council of 25 July 2017 agreeing on the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities, OJ L 236, 
14 September 2017, p. 23.
TABLE 6 EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities Addendum 2
Jordan Commitments EU Commitments 
-  50,000 jobs for Syrian refugees by end-2016; 75,000 by 
end-2017; 100,000 by end-2018, provided there is sufficient 
demand for work permits 
-  Education: public and free education was provided to at least 
140,000 Syrian children in 2016 and to at least 190,000 children 
at the end of 2017 
Bilateral 
Overall a minimum of €747 million of new funding was pledged in 2016 and 
2017, including: 
-  Macro-Financial Assistance loan of €200 million, provided pre-conditions 
are met  
-  €108 million humanitarian assistance 2016-17  
Syrian refugees  
The EU applies simplified Rules of Origin requirements to Jordan exports 
towards the EU under the following conditions:  
- 10 years’ duration  
- in 18 designated economic zones and industrial areas. 
Source: Addendum 2 of the Decision n° 1/2016 of the EU-Jordan Association Council of 19 December 2016
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social development; ii) Partners in foreign policy; iii) 
Enhancing stability. Compared to Jordan, Lebanon 
or even Algeria the general impression is that the 
EU-Egyptian approach is, for the time being, far less 
ambitious. There is no compact or any kind of ad-
dendum, and it is stressed, in the conclusion of the 
PP, that “in the spirit of co-ownership, the EU and 
Egypt have jointly defined Partnership Priorities and 
will develop an agreed evaluation and monitoring 
mechanism.” 
Tunisia (after the Jasmine Revolution) and Morocco 
have been considered as the Mediterranean front-
runners of the ENP. The priority of the EU’s sup-
port to Tunisia was confirmed in a joint communi-
cation adopted in September 2016 on the 
‘Strengthening of EU support to Tunisia,’10 to set 
out “further actions to promote long-term stability, 
including good governance, justice reform, socio-
economic development and security.” It also pro-
vided “a basis for the creation of the EU-Tunisia 
Joint Parliamentary Committee.”11 On the occa-
sion of the EU-Tunisia Association Council of 11 
May 2017 the “two sides held an exchange of 
views on the future framework of relations between 
Tunisia and the EU which will replace the Action 
Plan for a Privileged Partnership (2013-2017).”12 It 
is worth noting that a “second full round of nego-
tiation” regarding the Tunisian Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) is planned for 
the first half of 2018. For Morocco, DG trade indi-
cates that the latest DCFTA round of negotiation 
“took place in April 2014” and that the negotiations 
“were then put on hold to accommodate the plan 
of Morocco to carry out additional studies before 
continuing the negotiations.”13 In other words, the 
exact structure of the future EU-Morocco relation-
ship remains uncertain, while the negotiations of 
the Tunisian DCFTA are still on track.
Two Mediterranean countries, given their current 
situations, are in a specific situation. Libya never 
benefited from a contractual relationship with the 
EU and its internal situation remains extremely un-
stable. Therefore, the EU adjusted its cooperation 
to the “very particular circumstances, including by 
channelling support through municipalities” and 
with the implementation of the December 2015 
Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). The EU contin-
ues to “mediate with the objective of bringing all 
Libyan actors together to find a comprehensive 
agreement to restore law and order, enhance the 
rule of law, bring the armed and security forces 
under civilian control, avoid financial collapse, 
preserve the country’s unity and tackle terrorism 
and irregular migration.”14 Given the current situa-
tion, the EU also developed a specific Strategy for 
Syria.15
New frameworks for ‘bilateral 
engagement’ were concluded with 
some ENP partners through 
Partnership Priorities, updated 
Association Agendas or existing 
Action Plans
In the Eastern Neighbourhood, the main changes 
were introduced with the conclusion of three As-
sociation Agreements, including a DCFTA (AA-
DCFTA). With Ukraine, the DCFTA has been 
provisionally applied since 1 January 2016. EU-
Georgia and EU-Moldova Association Agreements 
entered into force in July 2016 and reviews of their 
Association Agenda for the period 2017-2020 are 
ongoing. Consultations on Partnership Priorities 
have also been launched with Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
and Belarus. As Armenia decided to join the Eura-
sian Customs Union, the AA DCFTA project was 
replaced by a “new Comprehensive and Enhanced 
10 european Commission and high representative. Joint Communication. “Strengthening EU support to Tunisia, JOIN(2016) 47 final, Brus-
sels 29 September 2016.
11 JOIN(2017) 18 final, p. 5.
12 Joint statement on the occasion of the EU-Tunisia Association Council of 11 May 2017, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releas-
es/2017/05/11/eu-tunisia-association/
13 dg trade. Overview of FTA and other trade negotiations, Updated March 2018, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/
tradoc_118238.pdf
14 JOIN(2017) 18 final, p. 5.
15 european Commission and high representative. Joint Communication Elements on an EU Strategy for Syria JOIN(2017) 11, 14 March 
2017 and Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on the EU strategy for Syria, Brussels, 3 April 2017, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2017/04/03-fac-conclusions-syria/
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Partnership Agreement” signed on 24 November 
2017. Azerbaijan also decided to negotiate the 
same type of agreement that excludes an FTA with 
the EU.
All in all, to replace ‘Action plans’ by ‘Partnership 
Priorities,’ basically means getting rid of the strict 
conditionality approach launched in 2011 with the 
so called ‘deep democracy criteria’ and to differ-
entiate more and adapt cooperation to the political 
will of the partner. The simultaneous publication of 
the ‘Regular reports’ for all partners benefitting 
from an ENP action plan has been abandoned. 
However, due to legal constraints, ‘Association 
Implementation Reports’ have been adopted with 
regard to Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia16, where-
as “Reports on the state of play of EU relations” 
with regard to Algeria17 and Tunisia “in the frame-
work of the renovated ENP” have also been intro-
duced.18 
To replace ‘Action plans’ by 
‘Partnership Priorities,’ basically 
means getting rid of the strict 
conditionality approach launched in 
2011 with the so called ‘deep 
democracy criteria’ and to 
differentiate more and adapt 
cooperation to the political will of the 
partner
This new approach, with regard to the cooperation 
modalities, has been complemented by the creation 
of a European External Investment Plan (EIP).
The New European External Investment Plan 
for Africa and the EU Neighbourhood 
The European Commission adopted, in September 
2016, a communication titled: “Strengthening Euro-
pean Investments for jobs and growth: Towards a 
second phase of the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments and a new European External Invest-
ment Plan.”19 The approach draws on the experi-
ence of the Investment Plan for Europe, the so-
called Juncker Plan20, and extends it to the EU 
Neighbourhood and Africa. The EIP contains, for in-
stance, priorities “inspired by the key principles of, 
and experience gained with, the Investment Plan for 
Europe”21 and its goal, that is to provide an EU 
guarantee to mobilize private investment. 
The EIP includes three elements designed to attain 
the general objective of job creation and sustainable 
growth: i) mobilizing investment; ii) stepping up tech-
nical assistance; and iii) supporting economic and 
structural reforms to improve the business and policy 
environment. This is perceived, by the Commission, 
as being a “key factor in transforming development 
policy and assistance” in order to support the 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and address the “multiple challenges faced 
in both the EU Neighbourhood and Africa.” The ob-
jectives of creating jobs and promoting sustainable 
growth in order to bring stability and improve “condi-
tions on the ground in fragile countries affected by 
conflict” will address the migratory challenge. Still, 
according to the Commission, a “new approach is 
needed to address the factors that constitute the root 
causes of migration, and to support partners to man-
age its consequences, both in Africa and in the EU 
Neighbourhood, by financing investments and ad-
dressing barriers to private investment.” The diagno-
sis is that:
16 See for example: Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova, Brussels, SWD(2017) 110 final, 10 March 2017.
17 european Commission and high representative. Rapport sur l’état des relations UE-Algérie dans le cadre de la PEV rénovée, SWD(2018) 
102 final, Brussels, 6 April 2018.
18 european Commission and high representative. Rapport sur l’état des relations UE-Tunisie dans le cadre de la Politique européenne de 
voisinage révisée, SWD(2017) 152 final, Brussels, 26 April 2017.
19 european Commission. Strengthening European Investments for jobs and growth: Towards a second phase of the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments and a new European External Investment Plan, COM(2016) 581, Brussels, 14 September 2016.
20 The Juncker Plan has three objectives: to remove obstacles to investment, to provide visibility and technical assistance to investment proj-
ects and to make smarter use of financial resources. The EU-wide results as of April 2018 are that: the “EFSI expected to trigger €284 billion 
in investments” and “90% of the original €315 billion target” were met, while “384 infrastructure and innovation projects” were approved, as 
well as “398 SME financing agreements.” Around “611,000 SMEs” are expected to benefit from the Plan. European Commission, April 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment/investment-plan-europe-juncker-plan/investment-plan-results_en
21 COM(2016) 581, p. 10.
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i) in 2015, “more than 60 million people left their 
places of origin (…). North African and Middle 
Eastern countries hosted about 40% of all dis-
placed people worldwide, Sub-Saharan Africa 
accounted for another 30%”;
ii) the EU’s “external policies, and in particular its 
development and Neighbourhood policies,” 
seek to promote prosperity but “economic 
growth in developing countries has now reached 
its lowest level since 2003”;
iii) As regards FDI “going to developing countries, 
only 6% goes to fragile countries, pushing down 
the investment per capita to a level almost five 
times lower than in other developing countries. 
Similarly, the cost to start a business is almost 
three times higher in fragile countries than in 
non-fragile countries.”22
In September 2017, a Regulation “establishing the 
European Fund for Sustainable Development 
(EFSD), the EFSD Guarantee and the EFSD Guar-
antee Fund” was adopted.23 The EFSD is one of the 
centrepieces of the EIP. It aims to support invest-
ments primarily in Africa and the Union’s Neigh-
bourhood as a means to contribute to the achieve-
ment of the SDGs, particularly “poverty eradication, 
as well as the commitments under the recently re-
vised European Neighbourhood Policy.” The direct 
link to the ENP mid-term review should be stressed. 
The preamble is also clear about the fact that the 
EFSD aims to address “specific socioeconomic 
root causes of migration, including irregular migra-
tion,” and to “contribute to the sustainable reinte-
gration of migrants returning to their countries of or-
igin and to the strengthening of transit and host 
communities.” The EFSD, should also “contribute to 
the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Cli-
mate Change.” According to Article 15 of the Regu-
lation, a “contribution of €350 million shall be pro-
vided by the general budget of the Union” for the 
EFSD Guarantee Fund.
Stimulating investments in Africa and the EU’s 
neighbourhood will not be an easy task. At EU insti-
tutional level, the European Commission created a 
Secretariat of the External Investment Plan and the 
EU Delegations and the European Investment Bank 
will play a crucial role in this regard. The Juncker 
plan seems to have worked well in the EU, but Af-
rica and the EU neighbourhoods are very different, 
from a private investor perspective. Country-risk 
analyses will, without doubt, remain the key indica-
tors for them.
Conclusion: Is ‘Principled Pragmatism’ Viable?
Principled pragmatism, which combines pragma-
tism and idealism, has been attributed to Abraham 
Lincoln’s method of political analysis24, itself in-
spired by Niccolo Machiavelli. 
Principled pragmatism looks appropriate for ad-
dressing a very volatile and complex situation, as it 
allows for notably quick reactions to crises and for 
greater flexibility in a difficult and changing geopo-
litical context. The fact that the EU institutions rec-
ognized the limits of the ENP is certainly positive, 
but the return to the Fortress Europe syndrome 
could affect the credibility of the European Union’s 
actions as a whole.
Only time will tell if this pragmatism will be more ap-
propriate and efficient than the ‘deep and sustainable 
democracy’ approach developed after the so-called 
Arab Spring. The reinforcement of a multi-speed 
ENP is, in any case, obvious. 
22 COM(2016) 581, pp. 6-7.
23 Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 September 2017 establishing the European Fund for 
Sustainable Development (EFSD), the EFSD Guarantee and the EFSD Guarantee Fund, Official Journal of the European Union, L 249, 27 
September 2017, pp. 1-16.
24 david J. siemers. “Principled Pragmatism: Abraham Lincoln’s Method of Political Analysis,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, n° 4, 
December 2004, pp. 804-827.
